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On 12 June 2011, Turkey held its general elections. The government AK Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) was able to maintain its absolute majority and win
a third consecutive term in office. This article assesses the key issues of the pre-
vious parliamentary term, examines the 2011 election campaign and provides
an outlook on the key issues that Turkey and its government are facing post elec-
tions. This includes an explanation of the controversy about some parliamentar-
ians who were elected whilst under arrest or being subject to criminal
proceedings. Other than that, our analysis focuses particularly on previous and
planned constitutional reforms, developments in the area of freedom of expres-
sion and Turkey–European Union relations.
1. Introduction
Turkey has recently seen the third consecutive general election, in which the
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; hereafter AKP)
obtained an absolute majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly
(Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi; hereafter Parliament or Turkish Parliament). In
the last three elections, the AKP succeeded not only in forming a single-party gov-
ernment, but also increased its share of the popular vote from 34% in 2002 to
46% in 2007 and, finally, to an impressive 49% in 2011 (see also Table 1). In
an article published in this journal after the 2007 elections, AKP’s success was
defined as a ‘landslide victory’ (Polat, 2009). In the same article, the political dis-
course of the elections was depicted to compose three key players: first, the AKP
that (or who) was ridding itself from its Islamic roots and rapidly moving towards
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being a central conservative political party with a liberal reformist agenda; sec-
ondly, a central secularist elite comprising the bureaucracy and military that
used the fear of political Islam and opposition to Kurdish minority rights to
resist political reforms, and thirdly, the European Union (EU) as a reform cata-
lyst, helping the AKP to push through its reform agenda without facing much
hostility and conflict due to the prospect of Turkish EU membership (Polat,
2009). Yet, four years on, the country’s political discourse has changed substan-
tially. On the one hand, the aforementioned bureaucratic elite have lost its lever-
age over the state’s institutions to a great extent. On the other hand, the AKP
government has seemingly embarked on a process of power centralisation that
could potentially undermine democracy and the rule of law and thus threaten
Turkey’s path to EU accession. Additionally, the EU as a reference point for pol-
itical, economic or social reforms has almost completely vanished from the public
discourse in Turkey. Case in point is the recent electoral campaigns in which none
of the big four parties made any reference (negative or positive) about the EU and
Turkey’s accession process.
In this note, we use the recent parliamentary elections in Turkey to analyse the
changing political discourse on Europe and the steady centralisation of power in
the hands of the AKP government. We start by providing a brief overview of the
AKP’s second term in office. In this, we look at the constitutional changes of 2010
and the trend of government restrictions vis-à-vis freedom of expression. This
first section also analyses briefly signs for a potential shift in Turkey’s foreign
policy—both towards the EU as well as the Middle East region. We will then
present an overview of the 2011 electoral campaigns (referring to the four
main parties of Turkish politics) followed by an analysis of the election results.
Finally, we present an outlook of what we think might be the key issues that
the new/old AKP government will focus on including constitutional reform
and the EU-accession negotiations, followed by a brief conclusion.







AKP 34.3/363/+363 46.7/341/223 49.8/327b/214
CHP 19.4/178/+178 20.9/112/266 26.0/135/+23
MHP 8.3/0/2129 14.3/71/+71 13.0/53/218
BDPa 1.0/9/+6 5.2/26/+18 6.6/35c/+8
aAll candidates ran and were elected officially as independents.











2. A brief look back: Turkish political discourse and the tendencies for
the centralisation of political power during the past parliamentary
term
The AKP came into power in 2002 with a pro-European reformist agenda and
significant support both at home and abroad (Polat, 2009).1 Likewise, in 2004
when the Council of European Union decided to open accession negotiations
with Turkey (Brussels European Council, 2004) the AKP was credited for
paving the way to this milestone decision by implementing significant political
and legal reforms (Baç, 2005). The AKP’s second term, however, is not a straight
continuation from its first five years in office. In 2008, only three years after the
opening of accession negotiations, the European Commission Progress Report on
Turkey stated that the (then) newly re-elected AKP government had ‘not put
forward a consistent and comprehensive programme of political and constitu-
tional reforms’. Similarly, the report pointed out that ‘the lack of dialogue and
spirit of compromise between the main political parties [in Turkey] had a nega-
tive impact on the smooth functioning of the political institutions’2 (Commis-
sion Staff Working Document, 2008, 2010). It seems therefore that the initial
momentum of EU accession negotiations has come to a halt.
Moreover, the government has departed on a somewhat more authoritarian
path with regard to freedom of speech and the independence of the judiciary.
Cases in point are especially the ‘Ergenekon’ and ‘Balyoz’ investigations as well
as the 2010 constitutional reform. The former investigation was opened initially
in 2007 against an alleged criminal organisation involved in terrorist and propa-
ganda activities with the eventual aim of overthrowing the AKP government. The
latter has been targeting an alleged military coup plan dated back to 2003. Par-
ticularly, the Ergenekon investigation became extremely complex in time with
the release of 15 different indictments against more than a hundred defendants
(Mavioğlu and Şık, 2010). Some go so far as to argue that the government has
used Ergenekon as a pretext to punish vocal government opponents and to
arrest government-critical journalists.3 The most prominent arrests under the in-
vestigation include Ahmet Şık, Nedim Şener, Mustafa Balbay and Soner Yalçın.4
Also, the leading columnist of Taraf (an originally pro-government Newspaper),
1Erhan Doğan (2005) provides an excellent historical overview of the development of AKP’s European
agenda in comparison to previous predominantly Islamist political parties of the country.
2The 2010 progress report follows the same critical tone.
3‘Onlar 101 gündür içerde . . . ’ [‘They have been in jail for 101 days . . . ’], Hürriyet, June 15, 2011.
4The only hard copies of Ahmet Şık’s government-critical book, ‘The Army of the Imam’ (as well as
electronic versions) were confiscated by the investigators. See also ‘Yayınevine “İmamın Ordusu”
baskını’ [‘“The Army of the Imam” down-raid to the publisher’], Hürriyet, March 24, 2011.
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Ahmet Altan, has faced a civil lawsuit for breaching Prime Minister Erdoğan’s
personal dignity by means of a critical newspaper column.5 Fittingly, Prime Min-
ister Erdoğan declared just one week before the elections that there should be
clear limits to the freedom of expression in Turkey.6 The fact that the country
has the largest number of imprisoned journalists in the world suggests that
some of these limits are already in place (Hürriyet Daily News, 8 April 2011).7
Finally, commonplace wiretapping by state agencies (The Economist, 2009) as
well new regulations on internet censorship8 have also attracted negative inter-
national attention. This is not to say that the AKP government’s track record
in terms of limiting freedom of speech is worse than that of any previous
Turkish government. Yet, the AKP came to power with the explicit, and unprece-
dented, promise that limitations of civil freedoms (including freedom of speech
and that of the press) would be no longer tolerated, and thus, transforming
Turkey into a modern western-style liberal democracy. In fact, those promises
brought the first AKP government the explicit support of liberal intellectuals in
Turkey and abroad.
In line with its proposed reform programme, the AKP government in 2010
proposed an extensive constitutional reform initiative. This comprised provisions
that would bring Turkish legal standards closer to those of Europe in areas such as
positive discrimination, protection of privacy, freedom of information and the
judicial control of administrative and criminal decisions of the military.9
However, the package also brought a significant increase in governmental
power with regards to the appointment of high court justices. This proposed
change included the Constitutional Court (responsible for the judicial control
of legislation) and the composition of the High Council of Judges and Prosecu-
tors (Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu) that deals with the composition and
5In his column entitled ‘Erdoğan ve Kof Kabadayılık’ [‘Erdoğan and Mere Bullying’, Taraf, January 15,
2011], Ahmet Altan criticised the attitude of Prime Minister in the ‘sculpture issue’. For the sculpture
issue, see ‘Turkey-Armenia friendship symbol being demolished’, accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-europe-13199787 on August 8, 2011.
6Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, live TV interview, 32. Gün, Elections Special Show, Kanal D, June 5, 2011.
7These journalists are held under arrest with general terrorism accusations with no conviction against
them.
8‘Turkey Slammed For “Ridiculous” Internet Censorship’, accessed at http://www.euractiv.com/en/
enlargement/turkey-slammed-ridiculous-internet-censorship-news-504608 on August 8, 2011. See
also Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2011).
9See the comparative table regarding the Proposed Legislation for the Amendment of Certain
Provisions of the Constitution, accessed at www.akparti.org.tr/media/www/Anayasa%20de%C4%
9Fi%C5%9Fikli%C4%9Fi%20kar%C5 %9F%C4%B1la%C5%9Ft%C4%B1rmal%C4%B1%20teklif%










administration of the judiciary. Civil society organisations and political parties in
opposition were not invited by the government to take part in any part of the
reform process. Rather the proposed amendments were single-handedly drafted
by the AKP government. This was in spite of the strong opposition to the judicial
reforms by civil society organisations, the Union of Judges and Prosecutors (Yar-
gıçlar ve Savcılar Birliği; YARSAV) and the Union of Bars (Türkiye Barolar
Birliği).10 The parliamentary vote on the reforms failed to reach the required
two-third majority and the reform package was henceforth sent to a national ref-
erendum.11 The opposition parties demanded that the different amendments
were split into different questions on the referendum ballot paper to avoid a
take-it or leave-it choice. That way constitutional changes advancing civil and
fundamental rights could have been evaluated separately from those politicising
the organisation of the Turkish judiciary (Milliyet, 2010). The government
rejected this request, and on 12 September 2010, the entire amendment
package was passed with the support of 57.9% of the vote—with a turnout of
73.7%.12
On the international stage, the AKP government under Prime Minister Erdo-
ğan’s leadership took steps to occupy a more powerful position, especially in the
Middle East region. The year 2010 was particularly eventful, due to the flotilla
crisis (The Guardian, 2010) as well as Erdoğan’s visit to Tehran (alongside the
Brazilian Prime Minister Lula da Silva) to sign an agreement on the trade of low-
enriched uranium. The United Nation’s final report with regard to the former
event depicted the blockade of Gaza by Israel as legal under international law
standards, thus caused criticism and disappointment on the side of Turkey.
Since the early and unexpected release of the ‘confidential’ report in September
2011, tension between the Israeli and Turkish governments has reached a new
climax (United Nations, 2011). The latter, Erdoğan’s Tehran visit, was at odds
with the well-known position of the USA, a long-time Turkish ally, who has
long campaigned for sanctioning Iran’s uranium enrichment programmes
(Aguirre, 2011). Overall, these changes in Turkish international and regional pol-
itics have not gone unnoticed as some wonder whether Turkey’s foreign policy
10See ‘982 Sayılı Anayasa Değişikliği Hakkındaki Yasa’nın Analitik İncelemesi—Ömer Faruk
Eminağaoğlu Yarsav Kurucu Başkanı’ [‘An Analytical Analysis of Legislation Number 982 amending
the Constitution- Ömer Faruk Eminağaoğlu, Founding Member of Yarsav’], accessed at www.yarsav.
org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=197:5982-sayl-anayasa-deiiklii-hakkndaki-
yasann-analitik-ncelemesi-oemer-faruk-eminaaolu-yarsav-kurucu-bakan&catid=1:ueyelerden-gelen-
yazlar&Itemid=46 on August 8, 2011.
11See Turkish Constitution, Art. 175 with regard to amendments to the Constitution.
12This is 12 percentage-points lower than the average turn out in national elections over the past 30
years.
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focus may be shifting from West to East (Barysch, 2011). These reflections have
been strongly rejected by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister,
who argued that the objective of the government is to place Turkey in an influ-
ential position in international politics as well as its region while staying in the
same distance to all players.13
3. Issue agendas of the major political parties in the election campaign
In principle, the language and substance that was used by the major political
parties differed substantially during the 2011 election campaign. Nevertheless,
they overlapped in leaving the EU accession out of the electoral discourse.
None of the political parties openly addressed Turkey’s EU membership objective
or declared their political vision for the country’s reform path towards accession.
No party openly opposed accession or dismissed EU membership either. Europe
simply vanished from the political agenda. This lack of EU reference appears to be
all the more significant when compared with the two previous political elections
in Turkey as well as the pre-accession political elections in central and eastern
European member states, where EU-related issues (both positive and negative)
had dominated the political election campaigns. Naturally, the reasons for the
demise of EU membership from the electoral discourse cannot be fully discussed
here for reasons of space and scope. It is worth mentioning, however, that those
reasons include, but are not restricted to, the raise of increasingly anti-Turkish
membership conservative governments in Europe; the eruption of economic
crisis in Europe that consumes political and institutional capacity on the side
of Europe and causes hesitations with regards to EU membership on the side
of Turkey; the lack of prospects for the effective resolution of Cyprus conflict
in the foreseeable future and the rapidly dropping public support for EU mem-
bership among the Turkish public due to all these factors.14
Still it must be surprising that the 2010 AKP election manifesto made reference
to the EU on only two of its 160 pages. Here, the party promises to continue pur-
suing the objective of EU membership while voicing disappointment and criti-
cism at the EU for its stand on the Cyprus issue and its consequential refusal
to negotiate chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations (AKP, 2011). However,
the AKP does not present a strategy on how to overcome the current stalemate
in accession negotiations nor does the party state whether this is actually their
objective.
13‘FM Davutoglu says Turkey sets its own Axis’, accessed at www.aa.com.tr/en/fm-davutoglu-says-
turkey-sets-its-own-axis.html on August 8, 2011.










When it comes to domestic socio-economic policies, the manifesto is essen-
tially backward-looking. It makes sparing references to the AKP governments’
past achievements without proposing concrete measures to be adopted in the
future. The vagueness of the AKP’s future plans is most peculiar with regard to
the announced constitutional reform. In election rallies, the Prime Minister
asked the people to give him the two-third parliamentary majority that is
required to change the constitution unilaterally in parliament and without a
public referendum. Yet, neither in the Prime Minister’s speeches nor anywhere
in the manifesto can one find concrete reference to the constitutional changes
that the AKP plans to implement. The call for a two-third majority seems to
suggest, however, that the party has clear ideas about the amendments—and pre-
sumably they are at odds with those of the other political forces in Turkey. Prob-
ably in light of the experience from the above-mentioned constitutional reform of
2010, the previously pro-government Economist (2011) called on Turkish citizens
to vote for the opponent Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi;
CHP) ‘to deny the AK Party the two-thirds majority it needs to rewrite the con-
stitution unilaterally’. Furthermore, during the 2011 campaign Prime Minister
Erdoğan started to adopt a much more nationalistic tone, targeting particularly
the Kurdish population. This strategy must be interpreted as an electoral tactic
to push the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi;
hereafter MHP) below the 10% electoral hurdle, thus, increasing the AKP’s
chances to achieve a two-third majority in Parliament—needed for the
announced (but not concretised) unilateral constitutional overhaul.
The 2011 election was the first election experience for the CHP’s new political
management. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was elected as leader by the Party Convention
on 22 May 2010—just over one year before the recent elections. Under Kılıçdar-
oğlu, the Party has rid itself from the old secularist guard that was traditionally
close to the military. In the election campaigns, the Party explicitly distanced
itself from previous campaigns that centred almost exclusively on the threats
raised by political Islam and the Kurdish movement against the secular and
unitary structure of the Turkish Republic. Instead, the Kılıçdaroğlu leadership
chose to use plain language focusing on economic problems as well as the
increased level of state corruption (CHP, 2011). The most recent Eurobarometer
indicates that a negative personal economic situation is still the largest single issue
for the Turkish population. Thus, unsurprisingly the CHP promised a public
‘family insurance’ as a solution to the still wide-spread rural poverty. The Party
made a strong effort to win over centrist and liberal voters by selecting parliamen-
tary candidates that were often distinct from its typical conservative–secularist
makeup. Those candidates include Şafak Pavey, a former UNHCR Public
Affairs Officer; İlhan Cihaner, a previous public prosecutor who investigated
the religious ‘ismailağa tariqah’ and was consequently investigated by the state
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himself; Mustafa Balbay, a journalist arrested under the Ergenekon investigation;
Prof. Mehmet Haberal, founder and former rector of Ankara Başkent University,
also arrested under the same investigation; Prof. Binnaz Toprak, a sociology pro-
fessor and the main contributor to the widely debated report ‘Being Different in
Turkey’15 prepared under the aegis of the Open Society Institute that reveals how
people get more conservative under social pressure in rural Anatolia; and Emine
Ülker Tarhan, Chairwomen of the aforementioned YARSAV.
The Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi; hereafter
BDP) was in no need of detailed campaigning—their main goals, equality and
improved minority protect, are well known. Particularly, education and the pro-
vision of other public services in their native language as well as a strengthening
of autonomous-governance in the Kurdish areas constitute the key points in
BDP’s political agenda. The only issue that can potentially divide the Party’s
voters are religion and conservatism, since the Kurdish-populated areas stand
among the most conservative areas of the country and this may at times cause
tensions with the essentially leftist roots of the BDP. However, in the recent elec-
tions, the party chose its parliamentary candidates very carefully in order to
prevent an alienation of conservative Kurdish voters. In fact, the party did not
put forward a nation-wide party list but rather selected a diverse number of ‘in-
dependent’ candidates. This was done to circumvent the unusually high 10%
electoral threshold that a party needs to pass in order to be represented in the
Turkish Parliament. Their lists of independent candidates included long-time
Kurdish activists, such as Leyla Zana (who was awarded the Sakharov Prize for
Freedom of Thought by the European Parliament in 1995 but was not able to
collect until she was finally released from prison in 2004) and Hatip Dicle;16 pro-
gressive candidates appealing to the younger generation, such as the movie dir-
ector Sırrı Süreyya Önder and long-standing socialist Ertuğrul Kürkçü; as well
as traditionally conservative Kurds such as Altan Tan and Şerafettin Elçi.
Finally, the party had to cope with an intensification of operations against
KCK (Koma Civakén Kurdistan, Confederation of the Kurdish People) allegedly
representing the ‘urban wing’ of the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan
Workers’ Party). The operations involved arrests of more than a hundred party
members, including a number of elected local officials, thus, disrupted the
BDP’s election campaign, especially in Southeast Turkey.
Finally, the nationalistic MHP was mainly concerned with internal damage
control rather than with running a content-driven campaign. It faced serious
15Accessed at http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/tr_farkli_olmak.pdf on August 8, 2011.
16The High Election Council of The Turkish Republic (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu) decided that Hatip Dicle
is not qualified to serve as a member of the Parliament due to the existence of a pre-election criminal










turmoil shortly before the elections due to a sex scandal. The anonymous release
of several video files resulted in a complete overhaul of the party’s leadership
prior to the elections. During the campaign, the Party portrayed itself as a
victim of negative campaigning by implying that the government was behind
the video release; although there was no actual proof for this. Moreover, the
MHP leader, Devlet Bahçeli attempted to focus on economic issues by criticising
the relative poverty of many Turks. However, Prime Minster Erdoğan was able to
thwart these remarks by simply pointing to the country’s continuous economic
success under the AKP government.
Generally speaking, the political environment preceding the 2011 Turkish elec-
tions was very hostile and characterised by intense debates among the AKP and
the remaining three major political parties. Apart from widespread accusations
about corruption, indecency and others among the political parties, there were
extensive protests and violence in some parts of the country. For example, in
Artvin Hopa, an anti-government protestor died during police raids shortly
after Erdoğan’s visit of the town,17 while several others claim to have been tor-
tured by the police while under arrest.18 In a TV interview, the Prime Minister
Erdoğan declared that he was convinced that the protesters were there only to
cause trouble, thus, rejecting the possibility of a public inquiry into the death
or the torture claims.19 This attitude seems peculiar especially with a view to
the AKP’s 2002 launched policy of ‘zero tolerance on torture’.20
4. Results
The election results revealed two clear winners: the governing AKP and the
Kurdish BDP. The AKP was able to obtain 49.9% of the popular vote—an
all-time high in Turkey for an incumbent government. It was initially attributed
326 members and thus fell four seats short of the three-fifth majority that is
needed to send constitutional amendments to a referendum; and 41 seats short
of the wished-for two-third majority necessary to amend the constitution
without a referendum. The Kurdish BDP was able to almost double its MPs
and was initially attributed 36 seats in the parliament. Its candidates were success-
ful in the densely Kurdish populated Southeast and also in Turkey’s large cities,
17‘Hopa’da AK Parti gerginliği: 1 ölü’ [‘AK Party Tension in Hopa: 1 casualty’], accessed at http://
www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25218521/ on August 8, 2011.
18‘Hopa protestolarına 15 tutuklama’ [‘15 arrests to Hopa protests’], accessed at http://www.
ntvmsnbc.com/id/25224462/ on August 8, 2011.
19Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, live TV interview, NTV, June 10, 2011.
20‘İşkenceye sıfır tolerans’ [‘Zero tolerance of torture’], accessed at http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/
icraat/293/iskenceye-sifir-tolerans on August 8, 2011.
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such as Istanbul and Mersin. The CHP also gained votes but fell short of its own
expectations—attracting only 25.9% of the popular vote. However, its leadership
was quick to point to the 23 extra seats the party won compared with the 2007
election. The nationalist MHP did not fall below the 10% threshold and made
it into Parliament with 53 seats receiving 12.9% of the votes—a decline of just
over 1% compared with 2007. Incidentally, had the Party not passed the electoral
threshold, the AKP would have had its desired two-third majority of parliamen-
tary seats—as was the case in 2002.
Following the official release of election results, the High Election Council of
The Turkish Republic (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu) stripped Hatip Dicle—a BDP ‘in-
dependent’ candidate who had won a seat in Diyarbakir—of his parliamentary
mandate due to the existence of a terror-related criminal conviction against
him.16 Since the BDP fielded independent candidates rather than a party list,
Dicle’s seat was reallocated to the AKP increasing total number of AKP seats to
327. Additionally, Turkish courts of first instance refused to release eight jailed
(but not yet convicted) MPs. These post-election developments resulted in the
emergence of a political crisis between the AKP government and the opposition.
The BDP, in particular, decided to boycott all parliamentary activities until the
AKP government would commit to a reform process that would allow all the
elected BDP members to take their seats in the parliament. Negotiations
between the AKP and the BDP for the resolution of crisis failed, upon which vio-
lence resurged in Southeast Turkey (Hürriyet Daily News, 2011). As has been
argued elsewhere by us, the post-election crisis will potentially play as important
a role on Turkish internal and external politics as the election result itself (Cengiz
and Hoffmann, 2011a, c; Euractiv, 2011).
The impressive AKP success in the election can be attributed to two predom-
inant factors: first, Turkey’s strong economic performance over the past years (see
also the next section). Although the AKP government has benefitted from
reforms that were implemented by its predecessor in the late 1990s, Prime Min-
ister Erdoğan’s government has presided over Turkey’s rise to the 17th largest
economy in the world with an annual growth of 8.9% in 2010. Secondly, Erdo-
ğan’s personal style of portraying a confident statesman strikes a chord with
many Turkish people who share his aspirations for Turkey as a strong regional
actor independent from the western agenda. Whether this can be attributed to
a yarning to the powerful past of the Ottoman times or simply a resurged national
pride after years of economic and geopolitical underperformance remains to be
seen.
It is worth nothing that the new Turkish parliament comprises many first-time
parliamentarians who do not live up to the characteristics of conventional
Turkish politicians. Rather than middle-aged men who have climbed up the










Their diverse backgrounds might arguably bode well for Turkey and its political
future. Moreover, the parliament now has the largest number of female MPs ever
in Turkish history adding further to the trend of an increased political diversity
and plurality. It is hoped that, this new heterogeneity will result in a vibrant and
vocal Parliament, which will be key, particularly with a view to the anticipated
constitutional reform agenda that is discussed in the next section.
5. A future outlook
After the re-convention of Turkish Parliament in October 2011, Turkish internal
politics is likely to turn its focus onto the drafting of a new constitution. There is
no doubt that Turkey is in need of a constitutional overhaul. The AKP cam-
paigned on this issue and its victory shows that the people also believe that fun-
damental legal reforms are key to build a sustainable Turkish democracy.
Crucially, a new Turkish constitution should enshrine fundamental rights and
freedoms, thus preventing any form of discrimination based on inter alia ethni-
city, gender, sexual orientation or other. These rights and freedoms must be
enforced by an impartial judicial system that is based on the rule of law and
not political or military ideology. Additionally, given the pre-election process
of centralisation of political power as well as the post-election crisis surrounding
the MPs under arrest, protection of the freedom of expression and the press, as
well as other fundamental political rights, particularly (Kurdish) minority
rights, are expected to play the key roles in the constitutional reform process.
It should be noted that the forthcoming changes would mark Turkey’s first ci-
vilian attempt at constitutional reform. Both the current 1982 and the previous
1961 constitutional texts were direct products of military coups (McLaren and
Cop, 2011) and hence this rare opportunity to draft a contemporary, liberal con-
stitution should not be missed. Constitutional reforms ought to be based on a
broad societal consensus. In fact, many countries require significant institutional
hurdles that can only be overcome if broad sections of population and politicians
are supportive.21 Erdoğan chose a soft-tone in his victory speech, indicating that
he will seek a broad compromise to implement the forthcoming reforms. Of
course, the government does not have the best track-record on consensus-based
constitutional reforms as the aforementioned 2010 experience showed. Similarly,
such a path would be in contrast to the AKP’s election campaign when it did not
cease to point to the importance of obtaining a two-third majority to implement
the party’s (yet to be revealed) constitutional vision. Based on this, Erdoğan’s
change in tone is noteworthy but not entirely convincing.
21In bicameral systems, super majorities are usually required in both chambers; in the Netherlands
parliamentary elections have to take place between drafting and adopting any constitutional change.
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Moreover, there is ample evidence of the Prime Minster’s strong desire to re-
structure the central political institutions along the lines of France’s semi-
presidential system (Star, 2010; Sabah, 2011). This system has served the Fifth Re-
public well and there is no immediate reason why it could not also be applied suc-
cessfully in other countries. However, the French system was masterminded by
General de Gaulle in a time of crisis because of the Forth Republic’s fragile pol-
itical system that had let to an unstable and often dead-locked parliament with
ever-changing governments and shifting parliamentary majorities (Gaffney,
2010). The situation in Turkey is not comparable to the France of late 1950s.
There is no evidence of institutional inefficiency in Turkey’s current parliamen-
tary democracy that would justify such a drastic systemic change. On the other
hand, in the light of the tendencies for centralisation of power, there is ample evi-
dence of the need for stronger constitutional protection of fundamental rights
and freedoms in this country.
In terms of international politics, the new/old AKP government’s principal
focus will most probably be in its region. This is indicated by Turkey’s rising
profile in the Middle East as well as recent developments such as the flood of
Syrian refugees to Turkey22 and Turkey’s key mediator position in the conflict
between El Fetih and Hamas.23 Of course, the key question for Turkey is
whether it can continue its path towards a regional power without its close ties
to the EU that come with the status of an accession country. Likewise, it is a
key question for the EU whether it can afford to lose a stable and powerful
partner in this volatile region without jeopardising its own aspiration to becom-
ing a global security player. Our central claim here is that a successful continu-
ation of EU-accession negotiations will be crucial for Turkey’s as well as the
EU’s general foreign policy credibility.
From this perspective, the unusual exclusion of EU-related rhetoric during the
election campaign is worrisome as it clearly indicates that EU is no longer a pri-
ority in the Turkish political agenda. Likewise, in a recent interview, Turkey’s Am-
bassador to the EU, Selim Kuneralp, explained that the EU role in the
constitution-making process will be minimal, since ‘the EU has lost its leverage
on Turkey’.24 Likewise, during EU Enlargement Commissioner Füle’s post-
election visit to Turkey, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Davutoğlu, announced in
another blunt statement that ‘if the Greek Cypriot side stalls negotiations and
22‘Suriyeli mültecilerin sayısı dokuz bine dayandı’ [The number of Syrian refugees reached nine
thousand’], accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2011/06/110616_syria_turkey.shtml
on August 8, 2011.
23Ortadoğu diplomasisi [‘Middle Eastern Diplomacy’], accessed at http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/
goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=18090524 on June 22, 2011.










takes over the presidency of the European Union in July 2012, this means not only
a deadlock on the island, but also a blockage, a freezing point in Turkey-European
Union relations’.25 These statements affirm the sentiment that accession negotia-
tions are in need of new impulses (see Cengiz and Hoffmann, 2011b) and stronger
commitment by Turkey and the EU, as well as its member states. Currently, the EU
refuses to continue the negotiation process in the open accession chapters due to
Turkey’s ‘failure to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agree-
ment’ regarding the Turkish–EU customs union.26 This stalemate in accession
negotiations resulted in a rapidly decreasing public support for EU membership
among the Turkish public27 that in turn gives the Turkish politicians the luxury
of avoiding the contentious EU topic. As we have argued elsewhere, the EU institu-
tions ought to develop immediate strategies to re-elevate this rapidly decreasing
public support, such as concessions on visa restrictions that would eventually
put the EU membership back on the agenda due to public pressure (Cengiz and
Hoffmann, 2011b).
6. Conclusions
Never before has a third-time election winner accrued more votes than the AKP did
in 2011 election. This success can be related back to Turkey’s impressive economic
record as well as a newly acquired boldness in its foreign policy. Yet, we have found
some indications, notably the undefined plans for constitutional reform and the
deadlock in Turkish–EU relations, that give reason to watch the new government’s
legislative agenda carefully. The success of the Kurdish party and its ‘independent’
candidates might yet be tarnished by the judicial decisions and will no doubt
attract further media exposure and academic commentary in Turkey as well as
abroad. Overall, it seems to us that Turkey is at a crossroads, its buoyant economic
performance and growing ambition to become a powerful regional player stand in
contrast to its stagnating EU-accession negotiations and its somewhat authoritar-
ian stand on the freedom of expression. The Turkish people have given the govern-
ment a powerful mandate—both numerically and symbolically—how it uses this
25‘Turkey says EU ties will freeze if no solution to Cyprus’, accessed at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/07/13/us-turkey-eu-cyprus-idUSTRE76C1PK20110713 on August 8, 2011.
26See Commission website on Turkish–EU relations, accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm on August 8, 2011.
27The 2004 Autumn Eurobarometer had shown 62% of the country looking favourably towards EU
membership with only 20% opposing it. In contrast, the Autumn 2010 Eurobarometer revealed
that only 42% believed EU membership would be a good thing, 32% believed it would be a bad
thing and the remaining interviewees had either no opinion or thought membership would be
neither good nor bad.
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power over the next five years might well have a lasting impact on Turkey’s standing
in Europe and the wider world.
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